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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 55 FALL 1980 NUMBER 1
THE FIRST AMENDMENT, MEDIA
CONGLOMERATES AND "BUSINESS"
CORPORATIONS: CAN CORPORATIONS
SAFELY INVOLVE THEMSELVES IN THE
POLITICAL PROCESS?
F. W. DIETMAR SCHAEFER*
INTRODUCTION
When the United States Supreme Court decided First Na-
tional Bank v. Bellotti1 in 1978, it held on an issue of first impres-
sion that the corporate identity of the speaker does not deprive
speech of the first amendment protection to which it would other-
wise be entitled. In so holding, the Court effectively decided that,
in addition to safeguarding individual self-expression, the first and
fourteenth amendments protect the "process" of disseminating
information to the public,3 Under the "process" rationale, first
amendment protection is premised on the speech and its contribu-
tion to public information, rather than on the first amendment in-
terests of the speaker itself.4 In Bellotti, that "process" involved
* Abitur, 1946, Gymnasium am Lietzensee, [West] Berlin, Germany; Freie Universitaet
Berlin-Law School, cand. iur. 1951; Yale Law School, J.D. 1957. Mr. Schaefer is Counsel to
Mobil Oil Corporation and appeared as of Counsel to Mobil Corporation as amicus curiae in
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n and Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Public Sero. Comm'n.
435 U.S. 765 (1978).
£ Id. at 778, 784, 795.
3 First amendment freedoms are viewed as part of the liberty safeguarded by the four-
teenth amendment due process clause. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S.
449, 460 (1958); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937); Stromberg v. California, 283
U.S. 359, 368 (1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
4 Although the Bellotti Court clarified the first amendment "process" rationale as it
applies to corporate expression, the concept that the first amendment protects a societal
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the dissemination of political views by corporations concerning ref-
erendum issues.5 In essence, Bellotti confirmed what many corpo-
rate counsel have always believed to be the law; corporations can-
not be prohibited from spending money.to publicize management's
views on public issues even where they are not "directly related" to
the "business" of the corporation.6 The progeny of the Bellotti de-
interest, as well as the interest in individual self-expression, is not new. The unfettered
discussion of public affairs in the "marketplace of ideas" is essential for informed self-gov-
ernment. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931); Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919); A. MEIKLE.JOHN, FREE SPEECH & ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERN-
MENT 19-20 (1948). The "marketplace" theory also has been adapted to extend first amend-
ment protection to commercial speech, see Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 100 S. Ct. 2343 (1980); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), and to forms of expression that merely enter-
tain rather than inform, see Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). The "pro-
cess" rationale, however, does have limitations. For example, although government may fos-
ter free expression, it generally cannot compel the expression of views. Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); L. TRIE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW
§ 12-8, at 604 & n.8 (1978). But cf. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)
(right of reply statutes upheld in limited area of broadcast media). See generally T. EMER-
SON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 697-715 (1970). The exclusion from protection
of certain forms of speech has been justified in terms of the first amendment "process"
where the speech involved constitutes "no essential part of any exposition of ideas" and may
incite violence or inflict injury. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942);
L. TRIE, supra, § 12-8. See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (libel);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam) (incitement); Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity). It is unclear to what extent the first amendment "process"
rationale will affect the regulation of access to information. Compare Saxbe v. Washington
Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974) with Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814
(1980).
5 435 U.S. at 776; see notes 11-16 and accompanying text infra.
' Prior to the Bellotti decision, there was little authority on the subject of free speech
rights of nonmedia corporations other than dicta contained in the decisions dealing with the
first amendment rights of labor unions. See, e.g., United States v. International Union, 352
U.S. 567, 593 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting); United States v. C.I.O., 335 U.S. 106, 144
(1948). See also Schwartz v. Romnes, 357 F. Supp. 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 495 F.2d 844
(2d Cir. 1974).
A look at New York law in the pre-Bellotti period illustrates the problems faced by
corporations who wished to make known their views on public issues. The New York Penal
Law prohibited corporations or organizations doing business in the state, other than those
maintained for political purposes, from making expenditures "for any political purpose
whatever." Ch. 792, § 671, [1928] N.Y. Laws 1669 (amended ch. 891, § 9, [1953] N.Y. Laws
2456 (current version at N.Y. ELECT. LAW § 14-116 (McKinney 1978)). As the law then
stood, officers, directors, stockholders, attorneys, and agents of corporations that violated
section 671 were guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by one year in prison and a maximum
$1000 fine. Id. Although corporate counsel suspected that the provision was unconstitu-
tional, the only reported judicial interpretation avoided the constitutional issue by constru-
ing the statute to exclude the defendant's activities. Pecora v. Queens County Bar Ass'n, 46
Misc. 2d 530, 260 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1965). Dictum in that opinion,
however, indicated that a literal application of the statute by the courts was unlikely, if only
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cision, Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission and
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commis-
sion,8 however, went further and established detailed standards
which a state must meet before it can regulate either the "politi-
cal" or the "commercial" speech of corporate entities, even highly
regulated utility corporations. Yet subsequent to Bellotti, ques-
tions remained as to what state interests might qualify as "compel-
ling" enough to warrant restrictions in the area of corporate politi-
cal spending and expression.
This Article will begin with an examination of the Supreme
Court's decision in Bellotti and its recognition of the first amend-
ment "process." The inquiry into the scope of the process will be
expanded upon by analyzing the two recent Supreme Court pro-
nouncements in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Com-
mission and Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Ser-
vice Commission. The Article will then attempt to apply the
Bellotti "process" analysis in the areas of corporate lobbying and
political election campaigns. Finally, and most importantly, the
Article will analyze the problematic area of the regulation of corpo-
rate "commercial" speech where such speech addresses public is-
sues. The Article concludes with the suggestion that the Supreme
Court should clarify the role of issue advertising in the context of
its contribution to the first amendment "process," lest the identity
of the speaker reinject itself as an element in determining the
scope of first amendment protection for corporate speech.
DEFINING THE FIRST AMENDMENT "PROCESS"
The Birth of the Process
The Massachusetts statute at issue in First National Bank v.
Bellotti made it a criminal offense 10 for banks and other specified
because it might have put The New York Times and other newspaper corporations out of
the business of endorsing candidates for political office. See id. at 536-37, 260 N.Y.S.2d at
123. Therefore, while it appeared that direct or indirect contributions to candidates for pub-
lic office were out of the question, it was unlikely that section 671 of the Penal Law would
be construed to prohibit activities such as lobbying by corporations. Nevertheless, there was
a feeling of uneasiness among counsel of general business corporations regarding the permis-
sible scope of such expressional activities because the statutory construction and caselaw on
which they relied before Bellotti was anything but conclusive.
7 100 S. Ct. 2326 (1980).
8 100 S. Ct. 2343 (1980).
1 See note 105 infra.
10 MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1980). Any corporation found guilty
1980]
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business corporations to make direct or indirect contributions or
expenditures "for the purpose of ... influencing or affecting the
vote on any question submitted to the voters, other than one mate-
rially affecting any of the property, business or assets of the corpo-
ration."' In addition to being applicable only to certain types of
corporations,12 the statute specified that "[n]o question submitted
to the voters solely concerning the taxation of the income, property
or transactions of individuals shall be deemed materially to affect
the property, business or assets of the corporation."13 The consti-
tutionality of the statute was challenged in a declaratory action
brought by two national banking corporations and three business
corporations.' 4 The petitioners alleged that the statute violated
their first amendment rights15 by forbidding them from opposing
publicly a referendum proposal to amend the Massachusetts con-
of violating this statute faced a fine of up to fifty thousand dollars and any officer, director,
or agent of a corporation who violated or authorized a violation was subject to a maximum
fine of ten thousand dollars or imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.
11 Id. Other states had enacted similar legislative prohibitions to prevent corporations
from supporting ballot issues, or from engaging in any political activities whatever. E.g., Act
of April 8, 1975, ch. 296, § 1, 1975 Mont. Laws 574 (current version at MoNT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 23-4744 (1980 Supp.)); Ch. 792, § 671, [1928] N.Y. Laws 1669 (amended ch. 891, § 9,
[1953] N.Y. Laws 2456 (current version at N.Y. ELECT. LAW § 14-116 (McKinney 1978)).
I The Massachusetts law applied only to banks and business corporations. MASs. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1980). Nonprofit corporations, as well as business trusts,
real estate investment trusts, and labor unions did not come within the statutory proscrip-
tion. See id.
11 Id. Because of the specific exclusion of individual taxation from the scope of matters
that "materially affected" a corporation's business, the Massachusetts statute has been criti-
cized as "a bold attempt to silence corporate opposition to a proposed constitutional amend-
ment" that raised questions about the power of government to dictate permissible subjects
and speakers. L. TRmE, supra note 4, at 57-58.
14 First Natl Bank v. Attorney General, 371 Mass. 773, 359 N.E.2d 1262, 1265 (1977),
rev'd, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). The petitioners, who planned to publicize their opinions on a
proposed constitutional amendment which they claimed would adversely affect their busi-
ness, brought their action after being informed by the Attorney General of Massachusetts
that he would enforce the section against them. 435 U.S. at 769.
15 359 N.E.2d at 1265-70, 1275. The petitioners alleged that section 8 violated the first
amendment as well as the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment, and analogous provisions of the state constitution. They requested, therefore,
that the statute be declared unconstitutional, both on its face and as applied to their pro-
posed expenditures. Id. In previous challenges to the statute, courts avoided the constitu-
tional issues by narrowly construing section 8 and its predecessors. See First Nat'l Bank v.
Attorney General, 362 Mass. 570, 290 N.E.2d 526 (1972); Lustwerk v. Lytron, Inc., 344 Mass.
647, 183 N.E.2d 871 (1962). As a result of such decisions, the Massachusetts legislature nar-
rowed the legislation by a series of amendments to specifically prohibit corporate expendi-
tures regarding ballot questions "solely" concerning "individual" taxation. First Natl Bank
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 769 n.3.
[Vol. 55:1
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stitution to allow a graduated personal income tax."8 The full Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld the constitutional-
ity of the statute, holding "that only when a general political issue
materially affects a corporation's business, property or assets may
that corporation claim First Amendment protection for its speech
and other activities entitling it to communicate its position on that
issue to the general public. 1 7
The United States Supreme Court, after disposing of an initial
question of mootness, 8 noted that the Massachusetts court im-
properly had phrased the issue as whether corporations have first
amendment rights coextensive with those of natural persons. 9 In-
stead of focusing on the first amendment rights of the speaker, the
United States Supreme Court chose to emphasize the type of ex-
pression involved, and stated the question as "whether the corpo-
rate identity of the speaker deprives this proposed speech of what
16 359 N.E.2d at 1266. The petitioners argued that the graduated personal income tax
would adversely affect their businesses because highly skilled executives would be discour-
aged from settling or continuing to work in Massachusetts. In addition, the petitioners felt
that corporations would be hesitant to operate in the state in light of the proposed tax
structure thereby causing a decrease in bank loans and other corporate activity. Id.
17 359 N.E.2d at 1270. The Supreme Judicial Court found that there was a rational
basis for the legislative determination that a ballot question concerning the taxation of indi-
viduals should not be deemed materially to affect the property, business, or assets of a cor-
poration. Id. at 1271. Adopting a narrow construction of the statute, the Supreme Judicial
Court flatly rejected the contention that section 8 was overbroad or vague, finding that the
specific prohibition against corporate expenditures on a referendum solely concerning indi-
vidual taxation was "both precise and definite." Id. at 1273-74. In essence, the Supreme
Judicial Court took the position that a corporation's first amendment rights of free speech
and expression are an incident of its property rights which are protected by the fourteenth
amendment due process clause. Id. at 1270; see note 21 infra.
Is 435 U.S. at 774-75. Although the 1976 referendum had been upheld and the proposed
constitutional amendment defeated, the United States Supreme Court held that, as a con-
troversy "capable of repetition, yet evading review," the case was not moot. Id. at 774.
11 Id. at 776. Corporations are not entitled to the constitutional guarantees that are
deemed purely personal, such as the privilege against self-incrimination, Wilson v. United
States, 221 U.S. 361, 382-86 (1911), or the right to privacy, California Bankers Ass'n v.
Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 65-67 (1974). In determining whether a corporation may claim a specific
constitutional protection, the Court has considered whether the "historic function" of the
constitutional provision has been solely in the nature of protection for individuals. United
States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698-701 (1944). This is not to say, however, that corporations
are excluded from all constitutional protections. See United States v. Martin Linen Supply
Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977) (double jeopardy); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S.
338, 353 (1977) (unreasonable search and seizure); Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac.
R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886) (due process, equal protection). In light of the historic function of
the first amendment in ensuring the free flow of information and ideas, corporate speech
clearly qualifies for at least some first amendment protection.
1980]
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otherwise would be its clear entitlement to protection."2
The majority opinion rejected the conclusion of the state court
that a corporation's first amendment protection derives from its
property rights under the fourteenth amendment.2 1 Instead, the
majority characterized the speech involved-comment on a refer-
endum issue-as "at the heart of the First Amendment protec-
tion. '2 2 Therefore, full first amendment protections were deemed
appropriate, since the type of speech involved was "indispensable
to decisionmaking in a democracy."2 s Although it noted that prior
decisions of the Court had afforded first amendment rights to cor-
porations only where the speech involved was intrinsic to the cor-
poration's business, the Bellotti majority found no indication in
those opinions that such a consideration had been dispositive.2 4 In-
20 435 U.S. at 778. The Bellotti majority indicated, however, that in some circum-
stances, restrictions on corporate expression might be applied for reasons that would be
inadequate to support restrictions on individual speech. Id. at 777-78 n.13. See also id. at
783-84 n.20.
21 Id. at 778-79. The property theory of free expression, sometimes referred to as the
"Field rationale" after Justice Field who authored the opinions developing the theory, pro-
claimed that a corporation has the same constitutional rights in the protection of it4 prop-
erty as would individual shareholders of the corporation had they conducted the same busi-
ness as an unincorporated group. E.g., County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pac. R.R., 18 F.
385 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883), af'd, 118 U.S. 394 (1886). See generally Northwestern Nat'l Life
Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243 (1906); Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26
(1889); O'Kelley, The Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revisited: Social and Political
Expresssion and the Corporation after First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEo. L.J. 1347,
1356-66 (1979).
22 435 U.S. at 776.
23 Id. at 777. The interest in affording free discussion of governmental affairs has re-
peatedly been recognized in decisions of the Court. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359
(1931). The Mills Court stated: "[Tihere is practically universal agreement that a major
purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental af-
fairs." 384 U.S. at 218. Implicit in any discussion of the first amendment process is the right
to have the government "not interfere with a willing speaker's liberty," see Baker, Commer-
cial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IowA L. REv. 1, 8 (1976), so as to
insure "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources." Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
24 435 U.S. at 781-83. Although a common factor linking cases that extended first
amendment protection to corporate speech was the close relationship between the speech
involved and the corporation's business, it is significant that none of the earlier opinions
even refers to this factor. Instead, the decisions stress the importance of free information
flow. See, e.g., Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 92 (1977);
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
763-64 (1976); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 904-06 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting from denial of cert.). The informative function of corporate expression was first
recognized with regard to commercial speech, which plays an indispensable role in the eco-
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stead, the majority pointed out that these cases, the press cases in
particular, stressed the informative function of the first amend-
ment "in affording the public access to discussion, debate, and the
dissemination of information and ideas."2 The Court concluded,
therefore, that a statute which dictates "the subjects about which
persons may speak and the speakers who may address a public
issue" 26 cannot survive constitutional muster without passing the
test of "exacting scrutiny. '27
Applying exacting scrutiny to the Massachusetts statute, the
Court looked to determine whether the state asserted a "compel-
ling" interest and whether the statute was narrowly drawn to fur-
ther only that interest.2 Treating the state's first justification for
the legislation, the Court found that the state's interest in preserv-
ing confidence in the electoral process was of the "highest impor-
tance. '29 The statute was found constitutionally defective, how-
nomic decisionmaking of the public. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 100 S. Ct. 2343, 2349 (1980). In short, the Court's view has been that free discus-
sion "must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable
the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period." Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940).
25 435 U.S. at 781-83. The decisions dealing with organizations involved in the business
of communications emphasize the public's informational interest as well as the press's role
as a medium of individual expression. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969);
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966). See
generally T. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 6; G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 1044 (9th ed. 1975).
26 435 U.S. at 784-85. The Court observed that the Massachusetts statute, by singling
out a particular type of ballot question, suggested that the legislature might have been at-
tempting to assist one side of the debate. Id. at 785-86. The majority opinion also rioted that
"[i]f a legislature may direct business corporations to 'stick to business,' it also may limit
other corporations--religious, charitable, or civic-to their respective 'business' when
addressing the public. Such power in government to channel the expression of views is un-
acceptable under the First Amendment." Id. at 785 (footnote omitted).
27 Id. at 786. The Supreme Court has established through consistent caselaw that the
test of "exacting scrutiny" will be applied where direct governmental prohibitions suppress
the communicative impact of protected speech. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976); L.
TRIE, supra note 4, at 602; see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam). In
addition to the requirement that a "compelling state interest" be demonstrated, the exact-
ing scrutiny test requires that there be a nexus between the goals sought and the legislative
means adopted, and that the enactment be neither over- nor underinclusive. Bates v. Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); cf. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 100 S. Ct. 2343 (1980) (commercial speech regulations subjected to intermediate
level of constitutional scrutiny).
28 435 U.S. at 788-95.
1, Id. at 788-89. The State of Massachusetts had advanced two principal justifications
for the prohibition of corporate speech. The first was the state's interest in sustaining the
active role of the individual citizen in the electoral process and thereby preventing diminu-
1980]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1
ever, because neither the state legislature nor the Massachusetts
courts had made findings that corporate participation in referenda
would unduly influence the outcome of the vote or reduce public
confidence in the government.30
As a second justification, the state asserted an interest in pro-
tecting the rights of shareholders whose views might differ from
those expressed by the corporation's management.$1 Assuming, ar-
guendo, that this interest was compelling, 2 the Court nevertheless
found that the statute was not narrowly drawn to further that
interest.33 Specifically, the statute was underinclusive in that it
prohibited corporate participation in referenda while permitting
corporations to lobby or to speak on public issues. 4 Moreover, the
statute was limited in its application to a narrow class of business
organizations.3 5 In addition to being underinclusive, the statute
was also overinclusive, according to the majority, since it "would
prohibit a corporation from supporting or opposing a referendum
proposal even if its shareholders unanimously authorized the con-
tribution or expenditure."36 As for dissident shareholders, the ma-
jority opinion pointed out that the remedies and procedures of cor-
porate democracy were open to them in order to protect their
interests37 in addition to the judicial remedy of a derivative suit in
tion of the citizen's confidence in government; the second was the interest in protecting the
rights of shareholders whose views differ from those expressed by management on behalf of
the corporation. Id. at 787.
30 Id. at 789-90.
:I Id. at 792-93.
32 Id. At 795.
33 Id. at 792-93.
34 Id. at 793. In addition, the majority found that the singling out of one issue on which
corporations could not express their views-individual taxation-belied the professed con-
cern with the interests of shareholders. Id.
31 Id. at 793; see note 12 supra.
36 435 U.S. at 794.
37 While the board of directors has the general discretionary authority to carry on the
business of the corporation, the shareholders do have the means to contribute to this pro-
cess. See N. LATrIN, THE LAW OF CORPORA7rONs 242 (2d ed. 1971). Corporate management,
in deciding the subjects of corporate expression and the amounts expended in doing so, are
well aware of the power of dissident shareholders to exercise control by voting to elect or
remove directors, amending bylaws, or submitting shareholder resolutions. See H. HENN,
THE LAW OF CORPORATIONs 361 (2d ed. 1970). A security holder does have the opportunity to
present proposals for action at a shareholder's meeting subject, however, to some restric-
tions. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14-8(c)(5)(7), 240.14a-9 (1980). In light of Bellotti's emphasis on
the role of shareholders, a recent SEC staff report recommends the reexamination of proxy
rules with a view toward assisting shareholders who seek to hold management accountable
for the expenditure of corporate funds for political purposes. FED. SEC. L. REP. No. 876, at 2
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the event of improper expenditures by management.38 Therefore,
having found the statute to have failed under this exacting scru-
tiny analysis, the Court declared it unconstitutional and reversed
the judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts."9
It is important to note that the Bellotti majority did not hold
that a corporation has first amendment rights coextensive with
those of an individual;40 rather, the entitlement to first amendment
protection was based on the nature of the speech involved and its
contribution to the dissemination of information to the public. It is
also significant that four Justices dissented on this very issue," ar-
guing that the source of first amendment protection for corporate
speech derives from the business interests of the corporation. 2 In
view of the closeness of the decision, it is necessary to examine the
dissenters' "business interests" theory of first amendment protec-
tion, with a view to its possible reemergence outside the particular
context of corporate speech on referenda.
(CCH, Sept. 10, 1980).
u435 U.S. at 794-95. The Court has held that employees cannot be compelled to con-
tribute union dues or service fees for the furtherance of political views with which they
disagree. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S.
740 (1961). The element of compulsion is absent, however, where shareholders of a corpora-
tion are involvedisince unlike the case in Abood where noncontributors were threatened
with a loss of employment, 431 U.S. at 212, dissident shareholders may choose either to
exercise their control through intracorporate means or reinvest their money elsewhere, 435
U.S. at 794 n.34.
31 435 U.S. at 795. The Court's holding in Bellotti was limited to "that portion of § 8
challenged by appellants," id.; thus, the portion of the statute banning corporate contribu-
tions or expenditures in political campaigns clearly was not at issue. See L. TRiB., supra
note 4, at 76 (Supp. 1979). The majority opinion indicated that in the context of corporate
spending in candidate election campaigns, a legislature "might well be able to demonstrate
the existence of a danger of real or apparent corruption." 435 U.S. at 788 n.26.
40 435 U.S. at 777 & n.13.
4" Justice White authored a dissent, joined by Justices Marshall and Brennan. Justice
Rehnquist dissented separately.
"1 Justice Rehnquist took the narrow view expressed in an early opinion by Chief
Justice Marshalh
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in
contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those
properties which the charter of creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as
incidental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to
effect the object for which it was created.
435 U.S. at 823 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819)). Justice White's analysis emphasized the view that corporate
speech is less entitled to first amendment protection than the speech of individual speakers,
except where the corporations have been organized for the express purpose of disseminating
opinion, see, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), or are media corporations. 435
U.S. at 804-06 (White, J., dissenting).
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The dissenting Justices in Bellotti argued that the proper is-
sue before the Court was "whether a State may prevent corporate
management from using the corporate treasury to propagate views
having no connection with the corporate business.' 3 Since corpo-
rations are creations of the state, the dissenting Justices reasoned
that they have only those rights expressly granted by the state, or
implied from the state's grant of the power to acquire and use
property. 4 Thus, the four dissenting Justices in Bellotti would
have conferred limited first amendment protection on the speech
of "business" corporations only in narrow areas-commercial
speech in the form of product advertising, and in the ambiguously
defined context of speech on public issues "necessarily incidental"
to the corporation's business. 5
In a variation of this property rights analysis, three of the dis-
senting Justices emphasized the associational interests of share-
holders.'8 Under this mode of analysis, unless a corporation is one
43 435 U.S. at 803 (White, J., dissenting); see id. at 822-23 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
44 Id. at 809 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 822 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The extreme
position voiced by the dissenting Justices appears to be overly restrictive in light of the
broad grants of authority conferred upon corporations by modern statutes. E.g., CAL. CORP.
CODE § 207 (Deering 1977 & Supp. 1980); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 121-122 (1974); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 202 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1980-1981). In contrast to,'je limited rights
of corporations expressed in early caselaw, e.g., Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Village of
Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 666-67 (1878); Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Harris, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 65,
81-82 (1870); Ohio & M.R.R. v. Wheeler, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 286, 295-97 (1861), the role of the
corporation as a "juridicial person" has expanded. See 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONs 28-49 (perm. ed. 1974); H. HENN, supra note 37, § 80. Signif-
icantly, in the caselaw denying first amendment protections to corporations, there is no indi-
cation that the basis of the decisions was the fact that corporations, rather than individuals,
were involved. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Pitts-
burgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
5 435 U.S. at 825-26 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see id. at 807-08 (White, J., dissent-
ing). The ambiguity inherent in any attempt to define what forms of expression might be
viewed by courts as "necessarily incidental" to the business of a corporation would "chill"
expression in areas other than direct product advertising because of corporate unwillingness
to risk penalties. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964); Smith v.
California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). In addition to
the valuable information that would be lost, corporations would be less willing to support
philanthropic causes since such support might reasonably be construed as "political speech"
on subjects unrelated to the corporation's business. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at
782 n.18. The result of the "business interests" test would be the undue impingement of
corporate expression, and as expressed by the Court in Smith v. California, "the free dis-
semination of ideas [might] be the loser." 361 U.S. at 151.
41 See 435 U.S. at 804 (White, J., dissenting). In Justice White's view, any first amend-
ment protection for corporate expression must derive from the expressional rights of its
shareholders. See id. at 803-06 (White, J., dissenting). The informational value of corporate
political speech, therefore, is offset by the fact that such opinions are "not a product of
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formed for the purpose of communicating the views of its share-
holders, or whose business is communications, the corporation's
speech on public issues is not entitled to first amendment protec-
tion.47 Conversely, commercial speech would be entitled to some
degree of protection, since advertising presumably would be fa-
vored by all corporate shareholders as a means of increasing the
company's business. 48 In terms of the first amendment "process,"
the dissenting Justices recognized the informational value of cor-
porate product advertising, or reports to employees, customers,
and shareholders on "matters relating to the functioning of corpo-
rations.' '49 Because of the dissociation with individual sharehold-
ers' views, however, corporate speech on public issues not "inte-
grally related" to the corporation's business could be viewed only
as expression of the "purely personal views of the management."50
Therefore, in the interest of protecting the first amendment rights
of shareholders who disagree with management's opinions, political
speech would be subject to the state's control.51 Moreover, in the
dissenters' view, because of the ease with which corporations are
permitted to accumulate capital, the state has a legitimate interest
in preventing corporations from using their favored economic posi-
tion to control public opinion on political issues not affecting their
business. 2
What is 'Unsettling about the reasoning used by the' dissenting
individual choice," and by the assumption that even the prohibition of corporate political
speech would not severely "impinge.. .upon the availability of ideas to the general pub-
lic." Id. at 807 (White, J., dissenting). The dissenters' views would work a curious inversion;
a corporation's "hawking of wares" would qualify for protection, whereas the discussion of
public issues would not. Moreover, the premise that corporate expression should be afforded
less protection than individual speech is equally applicable to any corporation-including
those that publish newspapers.
"I Id. at 805 (White, J., dissenting).
48 Id. (White, J., dissenting). The validity of the assumption that all corporate share-
holders are in favor of a corporation's product advertising is questionable. See note 57 and
accompanying text infra.
49 435 U.S. at 805 (White, J., dissenting).
- Id. at 803 (White, J., dissenting).
51 Id. at 813 (White, J., dissenting).
52 Id. at 809-10 (White, J., dissenting). Except in the limited area of broadcast media,
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), the Court has rejected the view that
the state may regulate the "marketplace of ideas" by controlling the speech of powerful
entities in order to enhance the voices of the less influential. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
48-49 (1976) (per curiam); see Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
The evaluation of a particular speaker's message is the public's right, not the government's
responsibility. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Meiklejohn, The First Amend-
ment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. Rav. 245, 263.
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Justices in Bellotti, is that if it had prevailed, or should prevail in
the future, it would leave corporate management uncertain as to
what communications might be viewed as within first amendment
protection, and what deemed the "purely personal views of the
management. 5 3 The dissenting opinions either underestimate or
deliberately disregard several important considerations. First, as
the majority opinion pointed out, corporate shareholders have
available intracorporate remedies where management advocates
political or social causes with which shareholders disagree.5 Be-
cause they are subject to removal by the shareholders, with or
without cause depending on the state statute and the corporate
charter or bylaws, boards of directors are sensitive to expressions
of disagreement with corporate policies by individual sharehold-
ers.55 The overwhelming majority of shareholders are principally
interested in a well-managed company, an appreciation of their
equity interest in the corporation, and in the dividends or earnings
on their shares. To the extent that shareholders are aware of these
economic interests, there is no comparable indication that share-
holders of publicly held corporations-even news media corpora-
tions-necessarily share a common set of political or social views.
It seems more likely that shareholders of corporations whose busi-
ness is communications invest in these companies to receive a re-
turn on their investments as do most shareholders of so-called
"profitmaking corporations."5 6 Moreover, to argue that a corpora-
tion's advertising is a protected form of speech because it advances
the interests of all shareholders is shortsighted, since surely not all
shareholders of a large corporation would approve of, or agree
with, all of the corporation's commercial messages. At least some
shareholders may be expected to oppose advertising expenditures
altogether.5 7 Furthermore, the interaction between corporate man-
" See note 6 supra.
5 435 U.S. at 794-95.
5 See note 37 supra.
See generally N. LAMrIN, supra note 37, at 533; W. FLETCHER, supra note 44, § 5318
at 603.
57 One commentator has illustrated the tenuousness of the argument that shareholders
of other than some small, closely held organizations are unanimous in their approval of
advertising:
[T]o presume this unanimity for a corporation such as General Motors is to
stretch credulity past the breaking point. Probably all shareholders wish General
Motors to prosper. Not all would wish to express that an Oldsmobile Cutlass is a
great buy. Indeed, some shareholders certainly believe that General Motors should
advertise more truthfully, some that it should advertise less truthfully, and some
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agement and shareholders belies the dissenters' concern that the
corporation would abuse the economic benefits of the corporate
form of organization by the unrestrained dissemination of views
unrelated to the corporation's business. It is unrealistic to suggest
that the considerable costs of purchasing advertising space or
broadcast time would not restrain management from using corpo-
rate funds to wage personal public opinion campaigns that were
not in the interests of the corporation." Indeed, anyone who has
read corporate "issue advertising" in quality newspapers and news
magazines will recognize that the issues discussed generally relate
to the concerns of the corporation, although they may not promote
the company or its products directly.5 '
Perhaps the most significant deficiency in the dissenters' "nec-
essarily incidental to business" test is that it does not adequately
justify the exclusion of media corporations, on constitutional or
factual grounds, from regulations that premise first amendment
protection of corporate speech upon the "business interests" of the
speaker. Indeed, this problem was emphasized by Chief Justice
Burger's concurring opinion in Bellotti in which he recognized the
problems inherent in attempting to distinguish media corporations
from general business corporations." Since modern media corpora-
tions are frequently conglomerates that control other businesses
involved in nonspeech activities, it is almost impossible to distin-
guish them on factual grounds from other "business" corpora-
tions.6 1 The similarity between niedia and "business" corporations
that it should not advertise at all.
O'Kelley, supra note 21, at 1373.
" See First Natl Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 810 n.10 (White, J., dissenting). The
corporation laws of many states provide for remedies against corporate management for
waste of corporate assets and for the personal appropriation of corporate funds by manage-
ment. E.g., IL. Rv. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.42 (1954); N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAw § 720 (McKinney
1963).
" For a discussion of corporate "issue" advertising, see notes 127 & 164-185 and accom-
panying text infra.
" 435 U.S. at 796-98 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
41 Id. at 796 (Burger, C.J., concurring). The lines of business in which media corpora-
tions engage extend beyond publishing into areas such as pulp and paper manufacturing,
trucking and shipping. In the case of one media corporation, Time Inc., forest products
accounted for 28.8% of its business in 1977. N.Y. Times, June 23, 1978, § D (Business Day),
at 12. It is clear that media corporations, as well as general business corporations benefit
from the advantages of the state-created corporate form of organization. First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 796-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 809 (White, J., dissenting).
Furthermore, the press is more likely to dominate public opinion, because of both editorial
expertise and the tendency toward concentration in the media. See Kleinfield, The Great
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"suggests the need for caution in limiting the First Amendment
rights of corporations as such. '6 2 Moreover, it is doubtful whether
a distinction can be made on constitutional grounds, since it is by
no means clear that the first amendment's freedom of the press
clause confers on the "institutional" press special protection not
enjoyed by other corporations.6 " Because history provides no clear
indication that the framers intended to single out an institution as
the sole beneficiary of "freedom of the press," and because of the
difficulties involved in determining who would qualify for such a
privilege,"" the Chief Justice concluded that the first amendment
"does not 'belong' to any definable category of persons or entities,"
but rather to all those "who exercise its freedoms." 65
In addition to recognizing the "business interests" rationale
espoused by the four dissenting Justices in Bellotti, it is also sig-
nificant to note that the Court limited its holding to that portion
of the Massachusetts statute prohibiting corporate speech on refer-
enda. The majority expressly declined to decide whether the regu-
lation of corporate expression in other areas would withstand con-
stitutional scrutiny. As a result, much of this legislation, the
Federal Election Campaign Act66 and similar state statutes, for ex-
Press Chain, N.Y. Times, April 8, 1979, § 6 (Magazine), at 41.
2 First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 802 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
" The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law... abridging free-
dom of speech, or of the press. . . ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I (emphasis added). The reason
for the speech/press duality is unclear from the history of the first amendment. L. LEVY,
LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION; FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERIcAN HISTORY 247
(1960). Recent decisions of the Court have been analyzed as the beginnings of an attempt to
define the meaning and scope of the press clause. See Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS
L.J. 631 (1975). But compare Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974) with Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). The commentators, however, are divided on the existence of a
special press privilege, see Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 77
(1975); Nimmer, Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does It Add to Freedom of
Speech? 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1975), and the Supreme Court has never directly addressed
the issue, First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 798 (Burger, C.J., concurring). It has been
pointed out, however, that whether or not the press enjoys a "preferred" first amendment
status, "freedom from undue interference with the acquisition of knowledge should be
deemed central to the first amendment." L. TRE, supra note 4, § 12-19 n.5, at 675-76. Such
a recognition is implicit in the first amendment "process" rationale.
" First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 801 (Burger, C.J., concurring). The process of
including some entities, while excluding others from the definition of "press" would be anal-
ogous to the practice of governmental licensing of the press, a system abhorrent to the fram-
ers of the first amendment. Id.; see Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); L. LEVY,
supra note 63, at 240-47.
11 435 U.S. at 802 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
66 2 U.S.C. § 441 (1976); see notes 116-30 and accompanying text infra.
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ample, will have to be tested on a case-by-case basis. Bellotti left
unclear, however, the guidelines for evaluating the constitutional-
ity of legislation which impacts on corporate expression. Specifi-
cally, it was not clear what types of federal and state interests
could be deemed compelling, or even substantial.67 Nor were rea-
sonable standards articulated by the Court to enable a determina-
tion of whether a sufficient nexus between the legislation regulat-
ing corporate speech and the interest it was designed to further do
in fact exist. As a result, the caselaw which followed the Bellotti
decision relied on conclusive statements as to whether or not a
compelling state interest was involved, 8 likewise avoiding the type
of reasoned analysis which, it would seem, the United States Su-
preme Court should have engaged in to buttress its conclusion in
Bellotti. The Court has, however, come closer to establishing
guidelines for analyzing restrictions on corporate expression in the
recent cases of Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commis-
sion 9 and Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission.70
17 435 U.S. at 820 (White, J., dissenting). Professor Tribe points out that the Court
merely assumed that the state'S interests were compelling, and focused instead upon the
defects of the statute in furthering those interests. Thus, he suggests, there was still consid-
erable room after Bellotti for restricting corporate advocacy of public issues. L. TRmE, supra
note 4, at 59 & n.14 (Supp. 1979). The Consolidated Edison and Central Hudson decisions,
however, make it clear that legislatures will face a weighty burden in attempting to justify
the curtailment of corporate speech on public issues and in the area of non-deceptive com-
mercial speech. See Fein, Free Speech in Ads Wins Key Plug From Brethren, Nat'l L.J.,
Nov. 17, 1980, at 15, col. 1.
" E.g., C & C Plywood Corp. v. Hanson, 583 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1978); Washington
Water Power Co. v. Kootenai Environmental Alliance, 99 Idaho 875, 591 P.2d 122 (1979).
The Hanson court, under facts similar to those presented in Bellotti, invalidated that por-
tion of an Idaho statute which prohibited certain business organizations from supporting or
opposing ballot issues by direct contributions. C & C Plywood Corp. v. Hanson, 583 F.2d at
425. The court rather cursorily dismissed the state's interests as "not ... sufficiently com-
pelling to permit the abridgement of First Amendment rights.. .," and in a brief para-
graph labelled the proscription "overbroad" without discussing the implications of the dis-
tinction in the statute between contributions and expenditures. Id. at 425. In Washington
Water Power Co., the court cited Bellotti approvingly, but avoided the first amendment
issue. Washington Water Power Co. v. Kootenai Environmental Alliance, 99 Idaho at 875,
591 P.2d at 122. Instead, the court invalidated an order of the state regulatory commission
that forbade the use of billing inserts for "political advocacy" on the ground that the com-
mission had exceeded its statutory authority. Id. Thus, while lower court decisions did not
indicate an attempt to pull back from the Bellotti decision, they also did not contribute to
an understanding of how the first amendment process would be applied outside the context
of corporate speech on referenda or ballot issues.
69 100 S. Ct. 2326 (1980).
0 100 S. Ct. 2343 (1980).
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Refining The Process
The first significant test of the ramifications of Bellotti arose
in New York when two electric utilities brought separate actions
challenging orders of the Public Service Commission7 1 of the State
of New York (PSC) as violative of the first and fourteenth amend-
ments. In Consolidated Edison, the Consolidated Edison Company
of New York (Con Edison) had enclosed an insert in its January
1976 billing envelope promoting the "benefits of nuclear power. 72
When Con Edison refused to send its customers a rebuttal as re-
quested by the Natural Resources Defense Council, that group
asked the PSC to make Con Edison's billing statements available
for the expression of contrasting views." Instead, the PSC issued
an order prohibiting the use of bill inserts by utility companies to
discuss "controversial issues of public policy. 17 4 The New York
Court of Appeals upheld the order as a legitimate time, place, and
manner restriction which served the state interest in protecting the
right to privacy of the utilities' customers. 7"
In the second case, Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission, Central Hudson sought to vacate that
71 The Public Service Commission (PSC) is a regulatory agency with broad supervisory
powers over electric utilities in New York. N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW §§ 2.12 & 66.1 (McKinney
1955). The extensive scope of the PSC's powers is due to the position of electric utilities as
monopolies permitted by the state in the public interest. See id. at § 68 (McKinney 1955); 2
A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 113-171 (1971),
72 100 S. Ct. at 2330.
73 Id. In addition to its general regulatory and supervisory powers, the PSC has specific
authority to control the format and content of the billing envelopes. N.Y. PUB. SERv. LAW §
66.12-a (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980).
7, Id.
"' 47 N.Y.2d at 108, 390 N.E.2d at 756, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 37. Since it viewed the PSC's
order as an indirect restraint on speech, the Court of Appeals applied the second level of
two-tiered constitutional analysis, balancing the first amendment interest against the indi-
vidual's right to privacy. Id. at 106-08, 390 N.E.2d at 755-56, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 35-37. Under
this mode of analysis, content-neutral regulations that indirectly impact upon speech will be
acceptable, provided they do not unduly restrict the flow of information and opinion. L.
TmaE, supra note 4, § 12-2. The Court of Appeals, however, did not adhere to the caveat
that in any balancing of interests under this approach, the first amendment "requires a
'thumb' on the scale to assure that the balance struck ... properly reflects the central
position of free speech in the constitutional scheme." Id. The Supreme Court generally has
not permitted the suppression of speech on the ground that it might be "offensive" to some
listeners unless substantive privacy interests are infringed in a manner which makes it im-
possible to avoid the intrusion. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974);
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). Cf. Organ-
ization for a Better Austin v. O'Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 420 (1971)(invalidating injunction
against leafletting in suburban residential areas).
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part of a PSC order that prohibited promotional advertising by
electric utilities.1 The PSC had concluded that promotional adver-
tising by utilities was adverse to the national energy conservation
policy in that it would encourage the use of electricity by providing
misleading signals that energy conservation was unnecessary. 7 The
New York Court of Appeals upheld this order as well, 78 holding
that the petitioner's "expressional rights" were not unconstitution-
ally impaired since the governmental interest in conserving energy
outweighed what the Court viewed as the limited informatibnal
value of advertising in the "noncompetitive market in which elec-
tric corporations operate."1 9
It is interesting to analyze the decision of the New York Court
of Appeals in terms of the Bellotti first amendment process. In
both the Consolidated Edison and Central Hudson cases, the
Court of Appeals, while implicitly recognizing that the free flow of
information is indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy,
minimized the possible informational value of bill inserts or pro-
7' 100 S. Ct. at 2347. The PSC originally had ordered electric utilities in New York to
cease all advertising that "promotes the use of electricity" originally in response to the 1973
fuel crisis. Id. After the fuel shortage had eased, the PSC nevertheless extended the prohibi-
tion, declaring all advertising promoting the use of electricity as contrary to the national
policy of conserving energy, and that additional usage would cause spiraling rate increases
to cover the marginal cost of new capacity. Id. The PSC's actions were taken pursuant to its
statutory obligations to assure a reasonable rate structure, see N.Y. Pun. SERv. LAW. § 66(5)
(McKinney 1955), and to encourage utility corporations to perform "with... care for the
public safety, the preservation of environmental values and the conservation of natural re-
sources, id. at § 5(2)(McKinney Supp. 1979-1980).
7 100 S. Ct. at 2348.
78 47 N.Y.2d at 111, 390 N.E.2d at 757, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 39.
71 Id. Unlike the ban on billing inserts, the Court viewed the PSC's prohibition of all
promotional advertising as a regulation aimed directly at the communicative impact of the
speech. Id. Because commercial speech qualifies for only "some" first amendment protec-
tion, Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978); Virginia State Bd. of Pharm.
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), the Court of Appeals at-
tempted "to apply the emerging principles" of commercial speech protection. 47 N.Y.2d at
108, 390 N.E.2d at 756, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 37. The result was that the New York Court upheld
a total prohibition of commercial speech that had not been shown to be misleading, e.g.,
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13, 15-16 (1979), nor related to illegal activity, e.g., Pitts-
burgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commn'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973). This
unprecedented action was based on the conclusive presumption that commercial advertising
in a noncompetitive market "lack[s] any beneficial informational content" and "may be af-
firmatively detrimental to the society." 47 N.Y. 2d at 111, 390 N.E.2d at 756, 417 N.Y.S. 2d
at 39. Furthermore, the Court's opinion did not attempt to determine whether a sufficient
nexus existed between the asserted state interest in energy conservation and the order, or
whether the state interest could have been served by less restrictive means. See 47 N.Y. 2d
at 111, 390 N.E.2d at 757, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 39.
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motional advertising.80 Specifically, in Consolidated Edison, the
Court overlooked the fact that the recipients might be interested
in information concerning the operations of their utilities and the
development of nuclear power.81 Furthermore, in Central Hudson,
the Court grossly understated the value of commercial information
emanating from a utility simply because of its monopoly status.82
In fairness to the New York Court of Appeals, however, it should
be noted that the Bellotti decision, while recognizing that states
could regulate in the area of corporate speech, did not clearly artic-
ulate the boundaries of the state's regulatory power. Interests
which may appear "compelling" to regulatory authorities may not
be so compelling when weighed against the public interest in the
free flow of information and opinion. Furthermore, since the pub-
lic's first amendment interest is so great, it is imperative for state
regulatory authorities and legislatures to demonstrate by specific
evidence that their actions are necessary to further their asserted
interests and are narrowly drawn so as not to overly infringe on
protected speech. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Supreme Court
reversed the New York Court of Appeals, and invalidated both
PSC orders.8
80 The monopoly status of the utilities involved in Consolidated Edison and Central
Hudson should not detract from the first amendment protection afforded to their speech. As
the Bellotti majority made clear: "The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity
for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corpora-
tion, association, union or individual." 435 U.S. at 777.
" The full discussion of public issues has repeatedly been recognized as a primary first
amendment interest. E.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966); Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940). Particularly with regard to the subject matter of the PSC
ban-"controversial matters of public policy"-the maxim often cited in support of the
public's informational interest is applicable. "[T]he best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market ... " Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
82 Even if the commercial messages of a monopolist might be said to be of lesser inter-
est to consumers, such speech should still qualify for its full measure of first amendment
protection, provided it is not misleading and does not promote illegal actions, regardless of
the speaker's monopoly status. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharm. v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763-64 (1976). The Court has afforded constitutional pro-
tection in the past to other heavily regulated businesses, see, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440
U.S. 1 (1979); Virginia State Bd. of Pharm. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976). Moreover, the degree of regulation of a business does not necessarily de-
crease the informative function of its speech. See generally Public Media Center v. FCC,
587 F.2d 1322 (1978); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of Berkeley, 60 Cal. App. 3d 123, 127-
29, 131 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1976).
"s Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 100 S. Ct. 2326 (1980); Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 100 S. Ct. 2343 (1980).
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In reversing Consolidated Edison, the United States Supreme
Court decided that the PSC's suppression of bill inserts that dis-
cussed controversial issues of public policy directly infringed on
speech protected by the first and fourteenth amendments." The
Court observed, however, that the PSC's ban on bill inserts was
not invalid per se merely because it restricted speech on public is-
sues."5 Rather, the majority considered three possible justifications
for upholding the PSC's prohibition of bill inserts.86 The Court
first rejected the PSC's contention that the order was a content-
neutral time, place, or manner restriction 7 because the PSC order
banned only the insertion of messages addressing controversial
public issues, while permitting the insertion of "useful" informa-
tion.88 In summary fashion, the Couit also dismissed the PSC's
second asserted justification, finding that even though the ban ap-
plied equally to all discussion of nuclear power, pro or con, the
order was an unacceptable subject-matter regulation. 9 In the ma-
100 S. Ct. at 2331. Although the PSC argued that the prohibition furthered a govern-
mental interest other than the suppression of speech, and should thus be evaluated accord-
ing to second-tier scrutiny, see, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968), the
New York Court of Appeals upheld the ban precisely because of the harmful effect of "con-
troversial" speech on unwilling recipients, 47 N.Y.2d at 106-07, 390 N.E.2d at 755, 417
N.Y.S.2d at 36.
100 S. Ct. at 2332.
Id. The PSC's prohibition of speech on commercial public issues might have been
upheld if it had been a content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction, see Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), a reasonable subject matter restriction, see Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), or had been narrowly drawn to serve a compelling
state interest, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 100 S. Ct. at 2332.
87 100 S. Ct. at 2333.
" Id. at 2333. A permissible time, place, or manner restriction must not be aimed at
controlling the content or subject matter of expression. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,
422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972). 100 S. Ct. at 2333.
8 100 S. Ct. at 2333. Subject matter restrictions have been permitted in narrow catego-
ries of speech, such as libel, obscenity, and fighting words. See note 4 supra. Although Con
Edison is a highly regulated business, the case did not fall within the narrow line of deci-
sions dealing with access to government property because the billing envelopes were the
property of Con Edison, at least until the time they were mailed. 100 S. Ct. at 2334. See
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
Justice Blackmun, dissenting, reasoned that the PSC's prohibition was not a typical prohi-
bition of a speaker's attempt to use his own "property" to promulgate the speaker's views.
Rather, it was akin to an appropriation of a subsidy from Con Edison's ratepayers. 100 S.
Ct. at 2343 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Thus, he suggested that the state permissibly might
define billing envelopes as the property of the ratepayers so that restrictions on the utility's
use of the billing envelopes would not be viewed as a deprivation of the corporate speaker's
first amendment rights. Id. This rationale is disturbingly reminiscent of the "property
rights" basis for first amendment protection that was rejected by the Bellotti majority. See
note 21 and accompanying text supra. If this line of reasoning should come to be accepted,
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jority's view, a prohibition that barred discussion of an entire topic
was no less objectionable than governmental restrictions of partic-
ular views:
As a general matter, "the First Amendment means that the
government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter or its content.". . . To allow
a government the choice of permissible subjects for public debate
would be to allow that government control over the search for
political truth.ss
Finally, the Court applied exacting scrutiny and determined that
the PSC's order was not a "precisely drawn means of serving a
compelling state interest."91 The state interest asserted by the PSC
was based primarily upon the privacy rights of consumers and the
need to protect a captive audience from the imposition of objec-
tionable views.2 In order for the prohibition of "intrusive" speech
to be upheld, however, there must be a showing that the "captive"
audience simply cannot avoid the objectionable speech.93 Here,
customers easily could have avoided the intrusion simply by throw-
ing away the insert or averting their eyes. " Only a showing that
"substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially
intolerable manner" 95 would justify the government's shutting off
discourse solely to protect others from hearing Con Edison's
views.96 The mere speculation of harm, the Court concluded, does
not constitute a compelling state interest."'
The Supreme Court also invalidated the prohibition of promo-
it is predictable that protracted discussions will ensue over what bill inserts are sufficiently
"related" to the corporation's business to justify their inclusion. Also, because the Court in
Consolidated Edison did not address the issue, the possibility of allocating costs for billing
inserts between shareholders and ratepayers seems to be a question likely to arise in the
future. See 100 S. Ct. at 2336; id. at 2337 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 2341-43 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
00 Id. at 2333 (citations omitted).
91 Id. at 2334-35.
02 Id. at 2335. The PSC's asserted interest in allocating limited resources for the benefit
of the public, see Red Lion Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), was dismissed
because billing envelopes are not as limited as broadcast wavelengths and because multiple
bill inserts would not result in a "cacaphony of competing voices." 100 S. Ct. at 2336. The
Court also found no basis in the record for the PSC's third asserted interest in protecting
ratepayers from bearing the costs of objectionable billing inserts. Id.
03 Id. at 2335; see note 75 supra.
100 S. Ct. at 2335; accord, Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1970).
Il 100 S. Ct. at 2335.
9 Id.
07 Id. at 2336.
(Vol. 55:1
19801 CORPORATE SPEECH
tional advertising that was the subject of Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, reversing the New
York Court of Appeals." Unlike the Consolidated Edison case,
Central Hudson involved the issue of whether the PSC's order
prohibiting promotional advertising by a utility corporation was an
unreasonable restriction on protected commercial speech.as Since
commercial, rather than political speech was implicated, the Su-
preme Court did not apply exacting scrutiny.100 Rather, the Court
stated that so long as the speech is not deceptive and does not
concern unlawful activity, the state's authority to regulate com-
mercial speech will not be upheld unless the regulation directly ad-
93 Id. at 2354.
"Id. at 2349. The Central Hudson Court defined "commercial speech" alternately as
"expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience," or
"speech proposing a commercial transaction." Id. at 2349. The two definitions should not be
viewed as being interchangeable, however, since different results may ensue, depending
upon which standard is applied. See notes 174-85 and accompanying text infra. The thresh-
old standard for determining whether regulations affect commercial speech is critical, since
commercial expression, unlike direct comment on public issues, is afforded only "some" first
amendment protection. Compare Virginia State Bd. of Pharm. v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) with Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
100 100 S. Ct. at 2350. Until fairly recently, the value of commercial expression in the
"marketplace of ideas" was not recognized and, therefore, such speech did not come within
the scope of first amendment protection. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
Even now, commercial speech is not afforded full first amendment protection. In view of the
first amendment concern with the informational function of commercial speech, it is recog-
nized that government may ban such speech if it is deceptive, see, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers,
440 U.S. 1, 13, 15-16 (1979), or promotes illegal practices, see, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973). The importance of mak-
ing a correct determination of whether a particular regulation impacts strictly on "commer-
cial" speech, and the difficulties inherent in doing so are clearly indicated by the divergence
of opinion expressed in the Central Hudson concurring and dissenting opinions. Justices
Blackmun and Brennan argued that a stricter standard than the intermediate level of scru-
tiny generally applied in commercial speech cases would be appropriate where, as here, a
state suppresses non-misleading advertising "in order to manipulate a private economic de-
cision that the State cannot or has not regulated or outlawed directly," by depriving the
public of the information necessary for making a free choice. 100 S. Ct. at 2355 (Blackmun,
J., concurring). Indeed, Justices Stevens and Brennan concurred that New York's ban on
promotional advertising by a utility exceeded the boundaries of commercial speech:
This ban encompasses a great deal more than mere proposals to engage in com-
mercial transactions. It prohibits all advocacy of the immediate or future use of
electricity. It curtails expression by an informed and interested group of persons
of their point of view on questions relating to the production and consumption of
electrical energy-questions frequently discussed and debated by our political
leaders.
Id. at 2359 (Stevens, J., concurring). But cf. id. at 2361 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)'(commer-
cial speech "occupies a significantly more subordinate position" in first amendment hier-
archy than recognized by the majority).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1
vances "substantial" state interests." 1 Further clarifying the Bel-
lotti first amendment "process" rationale, the Court once again
emphasized the importance of the public interest in the dissemina-
tion of information. Unlike the New York Court of Appeals, which
saw no informative value in the promotional advertising of a public
utilities monopoly,10 the Supreme Court pointed out that even ad-
vertising by a monopolist has legitimate economic significance.10 3
Since the decision to forego or not to forego increased consumption
faces every consumer regardless of the nature of the producer, the
Court rejected the view that commercial messages emanating from
a monopolist have no informational value.1 04 Therefore, because
the speech involved was neither false nor misleading, the Supreme
Court rejected the New York Court of Appeals' suggestion that the
utility company's advertising was not entitled to any first amend-
ment protection.1 0 5
The Court then went on to determine whether the PSC's pro-
hibition of promotional advertising directly advanced the con-
cededly substantial interests asserted by the state-energy conser-
vation1 0 and a fair and efficient utility rate structure.107 First,
examining the state's asserted interest in the optimal pricing of
101 100 S. Ct. at 2350.
o See notes 78-79 and accompanying text supra.
103 100 S. Ct. at 2352. Even assuming that consumers cannot choose the source of their
electrical power, the existence of interfuel competition has been noted by the Court. See
West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 294 U.S. 63, 72 (1935). Moreover, the deci-
sions faced by a consumer specifically regarding the monopoly supplier are not inconsequen-
tial, and include choices such as whether or not to purchase new services offered, 100 S. Ct.
at 2352, or choosing services that would result in more efficient energy use, id. at 2353.
104 100 S. Ct. at 2352.
105 Id. The Court enunciated the threshold requirement that commercial speech not be
misleading and concern lawful activity as the first of a four-step analysis for commercial
speech cases. Id. at 2351. Once that minimum standard has been met, the Court will con-
sider whether the government interest is "substantial." If so, the third and fourth steps
require a showing that the regulation directly advances the governmental interest, and that
it is no more extensive than necessary to achieve that goal. Id. The four-step test has been
criticized as imposing an almost insurmountable burden on government to establish the re-
quired nexus whenever complete prohibition of promotional advertising is contemplated.
See Fein, Free Speech in Ads Wins Key Plug from Brethren, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 17, 1980, at
15, col. 1.
106 The state feared that promotion of the use of electricity would encourage increased
demand and greater consumption, a concern that was warranted by our significant depen-
dence on foreign energy resources. 100 S. Ct. at 2352.
107 Increased consumption of electricity during peak demand periods especially con-
cerned the PSC because the increased cost of providing the additional power needed would
exceed the amount received through rates charged. Thus, the extra costs of production
would have to be compensated for by spiraling rates for all consumers. Id. at 2352-53.
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electricity, the Court found it speculative to suggest that a suffi-
cient nexus existed between the ban on promotional advertising
and the PSC's interest in maintaining an equitable rate struc-
ture. os Although such nexus was found to exist with regard to the
state's interest in energy conservation,109 the Court nevertheless
found the PSC order constitutionally infirm because it was more
extensive than necessary to further that interest.110 Specifically,
the Court found that the order would also prevent promotional ad-
vertising of energy-saving devices or services that would cause no
net increase in energy use.""
THE EFFECT OF THE BELLOTTI PROCESS ON REGULATION OF
CORPORATE POLITICAL SPEECH
The United States Supreme Court's decisions in the Consoli-
dated Edison and Central Hudson cases do not answer all ques-
tions regarding the effect of the first amendment "process" ration-
ale on statutes designed to limit or prohibit corporate political
expression. In the context of specific legislation or regulations, a
case-by-case determination will be required. Even so, the Court's
tandem decisions in these cases do clarify the first amendment
"process" analysis in several respects. It now does appear to be set-
tled that a state regulatory commission cannot, without violating a
utility's first and fourteenth amendment rights, ban billing inserts
by a utility expressing its views on controversial public policy is-
sues. Furthermore, in Consolidated Edison, the Court reaffirmed
108 Id. at 2353. In spite of the "substantial" interest in maintaining an equitable rate
structure, the ban on advertising failed because of the absence of any showing that advertis-
ing to increase usage during non-peak periods actually had the effect of increasing usage
during peak demand periods. Thus it has been suggested that in order to support such a
prohibition, the state would have to undertake an economic study of the correlation between
consumer demand and advertising, isolating the effect of advertising from other factors that
affect peak demand, for example, price, community wealth, industrial, and residential
growth. Fein, supra note 105, at 15, col. 1.
1" 100 S. Ct. at 2353.
110 Id. The ban indiscriminately pertained to all advertising by the utility company,
including commercial messages that would not aggravate the energy conservation problem.
Id. Moreover, the ban was sufficiently broad that it could be applied as well to "issue adver-
tising" by the utility on matters relevant to political discussion and debate and about which
the utility is particularly well informed. Id. at 2359 (Stevens, J., concurring).
111 Id. at 2353. The appellant contended that among its products and services were
devices designed to promote efficient energy use, among them the "heat pump" for use in
electrical heating, and the use of electric heat as a supplement to solar and other alternate
heat sources. Id.
1980]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
the importance of considering the nature of the speech involved,
regardless of the identity of the speaker.112 Thus, with regard to
direct comment on public affairs, the fact that the speaker is a
heavily regulated industry which has been granted monopoly sta-
tus by the state is of no import in determining the degree of pro-
tection to which the speech is entitled.'" 3 Most importantly, how-
ever, when Bellotti, Consolidated Edison, and Central Hudson are
read in conjunction, they provide valuable insights into the ap-
proach the Court may take in evaluating other restrictions on cor-
porate expression. It is to these other restrictions that we now
turn.
Federal and State Regulation of Corporate Spending in Political
Campaigns
The Bellotti majority addressed, without deciding, the issue of
whether legislative enactments prohibiting corporate spending in
election campaigns would be able to withstand constitutional scru-
tiny. 4 Due to the Court's determination in Bellotti that the cor-
porate identity of the speaker does not deprive speech of the con-
stitutional protection to which it would otherwise be entitled,11 5
speculation has arisen that the constitutionality of restrictions or
prohibitions of corporate spending in election campaigns must be
measured according to the same standards found appropriate for
evaluating restrictions on individual campaign spending.1 ' The
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1976 (also known as the Corrupt
Practices Act), for example, limits but does not entirely forbid, in-
dividual "contributions" to political campaigns;1 7 limitations of an
11S Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Consolidated Edison repeatedly cited to
the Bellotti decision in support of the view that the level of scrutiny to which regulations of
speech will be subjected is determined by the type of speech involved, and not by the corpo-
rate identity of the speaker. Id. at 2331, 2332, 2335, 2336-37.
Is Consolidated Edison's status as a state-regulated monopoly did not affect the in-
formative value of its opinions on public affairs, and, therefore, its status did not preclude
first amendment protection for its speech. Id. at 2331 n.1. Similarly, in the area of commer-
cial speech, the same principles were applied by the Court in Central Hudson, which re-
jected the view that the commercial messages of a monopolist were not entitled to protec-
tion because they did not contribute to the public's informational interest. See 100 S. Ct. at
2352.
114 435 U.S. at 788 n.26; see L. TRmE, supra note 4, at 76 n.2.
215 435 U.S. at 784.
116 See, e.g., 435 U.S. at 821 (White, J., dissenting); L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 76-77.
M Federal Election Campaign Act Amendment of 1976, § 320, 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1976).
The Act prohibits contributions by an individual to any candidate for federal office or his
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individual's independent "expenditures" in connection with federal
election campaigns are, however, constitutionally impermissible in
view of the Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo.115 Therefore, rea-
soning by analogy in Bellotti, Justice White stated in his dissent-
ing opinion: "If the corporate identity of the speaker makes no dif-
ference, all the Court has done is to reserve the formal interment
of the Corrupt Practices Act and similar state statutes for another
day."119 Nevertheless, application of the first amendment process
rationale does not mandate such a drastic conclusion.
It is clear that compelling governmental interests underlie fed-
eral and state1 20 corrupt practices legislation restricting corporate
political committee which exceed a total of $1,000. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(1)(A) (1976). The Act
also prohibits individual contributions to political committees operating under the auspices
of any national political party which exceed an aggregate of $20,000. 2 U.S.C. § 441(a)(1)(B)
(1976). Additionally, the Act proscribes individual contributions to other political commit-
tees exceeding a statutory maximum of $5,000. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C) (1976). Finally, indi-
vidual contributions to any of the aforementioned recipients may not exceed a maximum of
$25,000 annually. 2 U.S.C. § 441a (a)(3) (1976).
"' In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Supreme Court upheld limitations on
individual contributions to federal candidates contained in the 1974 Amendments. Compare
18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(1)(Supp. V 1975) (repealed 1976) with 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (1976),
and 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975) (repealed 1976) with 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(A)
(1976). However, the 1974 Amendments also set a maximum monetary limitation for indi-
vidual expenditures that were made "relative to a clearly identified candidate." 18 U.S.C.
§ 608(e) (Supp. V 1975) (repealed 1976). This limitation on individual "expenditures," un-
like the contribution limitations, was found by the Buckley Court to constitute "direct and
substantial restraints on the quality of political speech" in a manner that was not warranted
by the state interests involved. 424 U.S. at 38. First, the Court pointed out that the expendi-
ture limit did not effectively preclude corruption in election campaigns or the appearance of
corruption, because individuals could still spend money on the candidate's behalf, provided
that they did not expressly support or oppose the candidate's election. Id. at 45. Second,
and most important in terms of the first amendment process, the Court stated:
[The concept that the government may restrict the speech'of some elements of
our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the
First Amendment, which was designed "to secure 'the widest possible dissemina-
tion of information from diverse and antagonistic sources,"' and "'to assure un-
fettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people."'
Id. at 48-49 (citations omitted). As a result, Congress amended the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act in 1976, repealing the provisions limiting individual expenditures, but providing
for a restriction on the total expenditures by or on behalf of candidates for the office of
President as a condition of the candidate's receiving federal subsidies. Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, § 320, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(b)(1976); see 424 U.S. at 57 n.65.
1 435 U.S. at 820-21 (White, J., dissenting). Corporations are prohibited from making
any "contribution" or "expenditure ... in connection with" any primary election, conven-
tion, or caucus to select federal candidates. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (1976).
"0 The following 34 states currently have "corrupt practices" statutes prohibiting or
limiting corporate political spending. A. CODE § 10-2-168 (1975 & Supp. 1979); § 3-1110
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campaign spending. The Supreme Court repeatedly has recognized
the importance of the legislative goal of preserving confidence in
the electoral process by preventing corruption or the appearance of
corruption of elected officials. 121 In contrast to the situation con-
sidered in the Bellotti case, the legislature might well be able to
draw upon actual evidence of the corrupting influence on elected
officials of indebtedness to unions and corporations.122 Further-
more, it is questionable whether direct monetary contributions by
corporations to political campaigns actually further the first
amendment process since they are sterile with respect to the ideas
(1974 & Supp. 1977); Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-919 (Supp. 1980-1981); ALASKA STAT.
§ 15.13.070 (1976); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 3-1110 (1974 & Supp. 1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 9-336b to 9-336f (West 1980); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15 § 8004 (Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 106.08 (West Supp. 1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-5105 (1977); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 11-
204 (Supp. 1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 762 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980); IND. CODE ANN. 3-
4-3-3 (Burns Supp. 1980); IOWA CODE ANN. § 56.29 (West Supp. 1980); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-1709 (1974); Ky. REv. STAT. § 121.035 (Supp. 1980); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, 1395
(Supp. 1980-1981); MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 26-9 (Supp. 1978); MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
55, §§ 7-8 (West 1978); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 169.254-.255 (Supp. 1980-1981); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 210A.34 (West Supp. 1980); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-13-15 (Supp. 1980); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 13-35-227 (1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:34 -32, -45 (West 1964); N.Y.
ELEC. LAW § 14-116 (McKinney 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-269, -270 (1976); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 16-20-08 (Supp. 1977); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.03 (Page 1972); OKLA. STAT. tit
26, § 15-110 (Supp. 1979-1980); OR. REv. STAT. § 260.415 (1979); S.D. Comp. LAWS ANN. §
12-25-2 (Supp. 1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-132 (1979); TsX. ELEc. CODE ANN. arts. 14.06,
15.17 (Vernon Supp. 1980); W. VA. CODE § 3-8-8 (1979); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 11.38 (West
Supp. 1980-1981); Wyo. STAT. § 22-25-102 (1977).
2 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976); Pipefitters Local 562 v. United
States, 407 U.S. 385, 415-16 n.28 (1972); United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 570 (1957);
United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948). The legislative intent underlying the original
federal enactment was stated succinctly by Justice Reed in United States v. CIO:
This legislation seems to have been motivated by two considerations. First, the
necessity for destroying the influence over elections which corporations exercised
through financial contribution. Second, the feeling that corporate officials had no
moral right to use corporate funds for contributions to political parties without
the consent of the stockholders.
335 U.S. at 113. See also [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5587, 56-04-05; Final Report,
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign, S. REP. No. 93-981, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 571 (1974).
122 American history is a fertile source of examples of campaign corruption and demon-
strates that political contributors wield influence beyond their voting power. D. ADAMANY,
FINANCING POLITICs 236 (1969). See also G. BENSON, POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN AMERICA 169-
272 (1978); 0. DEMAIS, DIRTY BusINEsS: THE CORPORATE-POLITICAL MoNEY-PoWER GAME
362-63 (1974). See generally G. THAYER, WHO SHAKES THE MONEY TE? 108-22 (1973). The
"political bondage" that can result from large campaign contributions runs the gamut from
the contributor making the funds expressly conditional upon the politician advocating spe-
cific policies, to the more subtle, but no less pervasive tendency for the large contributor to
more easily gain the "good wishes and attentive ear of the candidate." L. TRIB E, supra note
4, at § 13-26 (1978).
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or opinions of the contributing corporation. s2 Thus, under the
Bellotti process rationale, there appears to be continuing constitu-
tional validity to federal and state legislation which prohibits cor-
porate spending that directly supports or opposes a particular can-
didate for public office. 1 4 Indeed, one lower federal court has
considered and rejected the "interment" argument in the context
of direct campaign contributions.125
" See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 21. "Expenditures" on the other hand, as a means
of disseminating the speaker's own political views, directly advance both the individual's
and the public's interest in the free expression of political opinion. See id. at 19-20, 39;
Note, The Unconstitutionality of Limitations on Contributions to Political Committees in
the 1976 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments, 89 YALE L.J. 953 (1977). See gener-
ally Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in
First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1482 (1975); Wright, Politics and the Consti-
tution: Is Money Speech? 85 YALE L. J. 1001 (1976).
1' The argument that the first amendment "process" rationale does not compel'the
"interment" of corrupt practices legislation is supported by the Bellotti decision itself. See
435 U.S. at 788 n.26. The Bellotti majority emphasized the importance of the governmental
interest in preventing the corruption of political officials, and implied that in the area of
corporate campaign spending, in contrast to corporate speech on referenda, even complete
prohibitions could be upheld:
[O]ur consideration of a corporation's right to speak on issues of general public
interest implies no comparable right in the quite different context of participation
in a political campaign for election to public office. Congress might well be able to
demonstrate the existence of a danger of real or apparent corruption in indepen-
dent expenditures by corporations to influence candidate elections.
Id.
115 Federal Election Comm'n v. Weinsten, 462 F. Supp. 243, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See
also Schwartz v. Romnes, 495 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Chestnut, 394 F.
Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 533 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1976). In Weinsten, the Federal Elec-
tions Commission brought an action against a corporation and its sole shareholder for viola-
tions of various provisions of the Federal Elections .Campaign Act, including the section
441(b) prohibition against "contributions" by corporations. 462 F. Supp. at 245. The Wein-
sten court upheld the pre-Bellotti determination in United States v. Chestnut, 394 F. Supp.
581 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affld, 533 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1976), that such a ban on corporate "contri-
butions" to federal election campaigns was permissible, notwithstanding the first amend-
ment interest involved, as the least drastic means of assuring integrity in the political pro-
cess during elections. 462 F. Supp. at 249. In attempting to ascertain the combined impact
of the Buckley and Bellotti decisions, however, the Weinsten court misconceived the import
of the first amendment process rationale, and instead analyzed the "speech" element of
political contributions strictly as a function of the right to individual self-expression. Id.
Nevertheless, in view of the lesser contribution to the first amendment informational pro-
cess made by direct campaign contributions, and the likelihood that actual legislative find-
ings of corruption or the appearance of corruption can be made, statutes that ban direct
corporate contributions are likely to be upheld. Moreover, it is important to note that Bel-
lotti did not hold that corporations have first amendment rights co-extensive with those of
individuals, but rather the Court implied that corporate speech might, in some circum-
stances, be subjected to greater restrictions than could be placed on individual speech. 435
U.S. at 777-78 n.13. Thus, Bellotti does not compel the conclusion that corporate campaign
contributions-like those of individuals-can be limited, but not prohibited. A total ban on
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Unlike corporate contributions to a particular candidate, cor-
porate "expenditures" in connection with a political campaign may
be entitled to first amendment protection. Indeed, in Buckley v.
Valeo, the Court nullified limitations on individual "expenditures"
in connection with a political campaign. 20 Since the informative
function of these expenditures is theoretically the same whether
the "speaker" is a corporation or an individual, the Buckley and
Bellotti decisions read in conjunction dictate the conclusion that
such limitations are constitutionally unsupportable.
The foregoing is not to suggest that easy distinctions can be
made under all circumstances. Issue advertising 127 by a corporation
that may support the position of an unnamed candidate in an elec-
tion campaign raises unique and complex questions which can only
be resolved on a case-by-case basis. 28 In particular, the critical in-
quiry is whether such corporate advertising is likely to be viewed
as an "expenditure" in connection with a campaign, as opposed to
a "contribution" to a particular candidate.2 9 Indeed, this problem
presented itself in a recent United States senatorial election cam-
paign. In In re Mobil Oil Corp.,5 0 a complaint was filed with the
Federal Election Commission, alleging that the Mobil Oil Corpora-
tion had made an illegal campaign contribution to the campaign of
Senator Lowell Weicker in the form of a nationally published ad-
corporate contributions might reasonably be upheld as the only means of preventing a cor-
poration's shareholders from circumventing the limitations on individual contributions. L.
TRE, supra note 4, at 76.
1-26 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). Unlike limitations on individual contributions, which
were viewed as only a "marginal curtailment" of expressional and associational freedoms,
the limitations on individual expenditures in relation to an election campaign constituted
"direct and substantial restraints" on political speech. Id. at 39.
127 The term "issue advertising" as used in this Article refers to the purchase of space
in publications or broadcast time to publicize the corporations' views on issues of public
interest.
22 While it is fair to conclude that, for the most part, the Federal Election Campaign
Act provisions regarding corporate contributions to election campaigns will be unscathed by
the first amendment "process" rationale, there are still state corrupt practices acts too nu-
merous to treat in detail within this Article. See note 120 supra. Overly broad prohibitions
of corporate expenditures "for any political purpose whatever" or prohibitions that include
corporate spending on referenda, however, seem likely to fall. But see 1978 Op. N.Y. State
Bd. of Elect. No. 9, which states that the Bellotti decision, while invalidating laws limiting a
corporation's spending with regard to non-partisan referenda, does not affect the validity of
N.Y. ELEcT. LAW § 14-116 (McKinney 1978) which restricts corporate support of candidates
to an annual maximum of $5,000. Id.
129 See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1976).
220 In re Mobil Oil Corp., MUR 319 (76) (Feb. 28, 1977).
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vertisement. 11 The advertisement in question urged voters to be
aware of candidates' positions on energy-related issues but did not
identify any particular candidate by name.132 Although the Com-
mission found that an investigation was unwarranted, it pointed
out that the mere fact that no candidate was named was not dis-
positive of whether the advertisement was an expenditure in con-
nection with an election.138 Clarifying its position, the Commission
stated:
[W]here, as here, no candidate was named or even indirectly sug-
gested by the ads, the ads were distributed nationwide and were
part of a series of ads relating to the subject of energy policy, and
the issue to which the ads were related was one of multifaceted
complexity, the mere fact that knowledgeable... voters might
infer that Mobil preferred [one candidate] over [another] does
not afford reason to believe that the advertisement was placed "in
connection with" the Connecticut senatorial election.1 4
This case is a good illustration of the jagged edges of issue adver-
tising during political campaigns, since it points out that the result
might have been different if the advertisement was in connection
with an election in a particular district and had been targeted to
that district. Although it would be futile to define in the abstract
at what point issue advertising would run afoul of corrupt practices
legislation, corporate speech on issues vital to informed public
opinion appear to be protected by the Bellotti's first amendment
process. To the extent that the state interest in preventing corrup-
tion of the electoral process can be protected by narrower forms of
131 The advertisement urged voters to familiarize themselves with the views of un-
named candidates on energy-related issues - oil and gas pricing in particular. It appeared
on October 17, 1976 in a multitude of magazines and newspapers around the country, in-
cluding the New York Times Magazine and the Sunday magazines of various Connecticut
papers. The advertisement was not written with a specific candidate in mind, but rather was
based on "typical arguments advanced by politicians attacking oil companies," according to
the response submitted to the Commission by Mobil's General Counsel. The advertisement
at issue was styled as a "Voters' Guide to the Political Cheap Shot" and was purportedly an
effort to "clean up" some of "the political pollution" caused by candidates who "continue to
play politics with energy issues." Under three colloquial-style headings - the "Dollar-a-
Gallon Ploy," the "Obscene Profits Bit," the "Keep it Vague Crowd" - the advertisement
set forth ploys used by what Mobil viewed as insincere "energy candidates." In a final para-
graph, the advertisment provided a "good-guy checklist," without referring to any particular
candidate or party. N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1976, § 6 (Magazine), at 38.
232 Id.
13 In re Mobil Oil Corp., MUR 319 (76) (Feb. 28, 1977).
13 Id.
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regulation-such as requiring disclosure of the source of the adver-
tisement-prohibitions of corporate expenditures in the area of po-
litical speech during election campaigns may survive constitutional
attack.23 5
Corporate Lobbying Restrictions
The challenge to the Massachusetts statute in Bellotti devel-
oped out of an attempt by several corporations and banking as-
sociations to express their position on a referendum issue to the
public, rather than to the legislators directly.13 The Court's deci-
sion indicates that such indirect or "grass roots" 137 lobbying is en-
titled to first amendment protection. Therefore, absent a compel-
ling subordinating interest, governmental action which prohibits
indirect lobbying by corporations on legislation, propositions, or
referenda should be declared unconstitutional.38 This is so even if
the lobbying is totally unrelated to the corporation's business.
The Bellotti decision, therefore, raises the question of whether
various state lobbying registration laws will withstand first amend-
ment challenge. When lobbying registration legislation is examined
in light of Bellotti's process rationale, it appears that content-neu-
tral regulations will survive strict first amendment scrutiny.3 "
135 See 1978 Op. N.Y. State Bd. of Elect. No. 9. Significantly, the Supreme Court in
Buckley v. Valeo found that the disclosure provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act
withstood the test of exacting constitutional scrutiny. 424 U.S. at 64. By informing the vot-
ers of candidates' supporters, the disclosure provisions were found to enhance the ability of
voters to make a meaningful choice; actual corruption was deterred by exposing large con-
tributors to public view; and the disclosure provisions assisted the state in searching out
violations of the contribution limitations. Id.
136 435 U.S. at 765. Corporations have long recognized the value of public opinion to
legislators; thus, the practice commonly known as "grass roots lobbying," which is aimed at
influencing public opinion, often supplements a corporation's direct lobbying activities. See
generally A. HOLTZMAN, INTEREST GROUPS AND LOBBYING 99-107 (1966).
137 For purposes of this Article, the term "grass roots" campaign refers to "attempts to
urge or encourage the public to contact members of a legislative body for the purpose of
proposing, supporting, or opposing legislation." See 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-20 (c) (4) (1980). See
also Land, Federal Lobbying Disclosure Reform Legislation, 17 HARv. J. LEGis. 295, 298
(1980). See generally HOUSE SELc'r COMM. ON LOBBYING AcTivrrins, GENERAL INTERIM
REP'T, H.R. REP. No. 3138, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1950).
138 See 435 U.S. at 786. Such a prohibition of "grass roots" lobbying would clearly have
an adverse impact upon the first amendment process, since the essence of this type of lobby-
ing campaign is public communication, and the speech itself is "intimately related to the
process of governing." Id.
' The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946, 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-270 (1976), is the
only federal statute regulating lobbying activities. The Act does not impose monetary re-
strictions on lobbying expenditures, but requires registration of lobbyists, and the regular
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Typically, lobbying legislation is not aimed at restricting the free
flow of information in a democracy, but rather is designed to pro-
mote integrity in government by requiring disclosure of the inter-
ests responsible for the dissemination of the views espoused by the
lobbyist.140 Certainly the prevention of deception resulting from
the concealment of the identity of the interests represented by the
lobbyist furthers, rather than inhibits, the effective operation of
the first amendment process. Indeed, although the Court in Cen-
tral Hudson addressed a restriction on commercial speech, it noted
the importance of ensuring that information not be misleading.
14 1
Moreover, the possibility of deception in lobbying is hardly illu-
sory. 1 42 The Supreme Court previously had been confronted with a
case involving the use of a third party to influence public and legis-
lative opinion through the circulation of propaganda.1 43 Although
the Court did not decide the issue, it implied that the control of
such reprehensible conduct was within legislative competence.
14 4
While it may be reasonable to conclude that the federal and
state lobbying registration statutes will withstand constitutional
challenge after Bellotti, it is not certain whether other statutes
which impact adversely on corporate political speech in the form of
lobbying will likewise be sustained by the courts. For example,
under existing United States Treasury Regulations, corporations
are given deductions for "good will" and "institutional" advertis-
reporting of amounts spent or received in lobbying activities. 2 U.S.C. §§ 264, 267 (1976).
140 In United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954), the Court defined the purpose of
the federal lobbying law as assisting legislators in evaluating the pressures being brought to
bear against them. 347 U.S. at 625. See also ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 63, § 176 (Supp. 1980-1981);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 42.17.010-.030, .240 (Supp. 1980-1981). For a comprehensive his-
tory of state regulation of lobbying, see Comment, Improving the Legislative Process: Fed-
eral Regulation of Lobbying, 56 YALE L.J. 304, 313-16 (1947).
141 100 S. Ct. at 2350.
142 See Note, Federal Lobbying Disclosure Reform Legislation, 17 HARV. J. LEGIS. 295,
297 (1980); Norrgard, Lobbying Laws in Illinois: An Incomplete Reform, 27 DEPAUL L. REV.
761, 763 (1978). See generally E. LANE, LOBBYING AND THE LAW (1964).
143 Eastern RPL Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). In
Noerr, the plaintiffs, a group of trucking companies charged, inter alia, that the railroad
companies had employed a public relations firm "to conduct a publicity campaign against
the truckers designed to foster the adoption and retention of laws ... destructive of the
trucking business... and to impair the relationships existing between the truckers" and
the general public. Id. at 129. The third-party technique used by Noerr in its alleged at-
tempt to damage competition involved the circulation of propaganda by an interested party,
who made it appear to be the spontaneous expression of independent groups, thereby de-
ceiving both the public and the legislature. Id. at 140, 145.
14 365 U.S. at 141 & n.21.
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ing,145 for expenditures on advertising presenting "views on eco-
nomic, financial, social, or other subjects of a general nature,1 46
and for direct lobbying expenditures on legislation that is of "di-
rect interest" to their trade or business. 4 7 The regulations specifi-
cally provide, however, that "no deduction shall be allowed for any
expenses incurred in connection with 'grassroot' campaigns. 1
48
This distinction is problematic, since it is not always discernible
whether advertising on a-particular subject is of a "general na-
ture," and therefore deductible, or part of a "grass root campaign"
and hence not deductible.149 Furthermore, the "business interests"
of the speaker theory as a basis for regulating corporate speech was
expressly rejected by the Supreme Court in Bellotti. To the extent,
therefore, that the tax laws treat grass roots lobbying unfavorably
relative to other types of advertising expenditures, their status is
placed in question.
In terms of the Bellotti process rationale, such tax treatment
inhibits the flow of information and ideas on public issues directly
affecting legislation and self-governance.1 50 This is not to suggest
that the courts will nullify the regulations, but suggests that the
exacting scrutiny test may have to be satisfied. In fact, subsequent
to Bellotti, an action seeking injunctive relief was brought by the
National Association of Manufacturers attacking the disallowance
of tax deductions for grass roots lobbying as an unconstitutional
infringement on the business rights of free speech.151 Although the
15 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-20(a)(2)(1980). Regarding institutional (or good will) advertising,
the Treasury Regulation provides that "a deduction will ordinarily be allowed for the cost of
advertising which keeps the taxpayer's name before the public in connection with encourag-
ing contributions to such organizations as the Red Cross, the purchase of United States
Savings Bonds, or participation in similar causes." Id. This type of advertising would in-
clude, for example, corporate underwriting of programs for television, expenditures to urge
support for a public library, sponsoring programs of concerts, opera and theatre in city
parks, and promoting such activities as the Interracial Council for Business Opportunity.
-46 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-20 (1980). This category would encompass non-controversial sub-
jects, on which a company may be expected to have some expertise, such as fuel conserva-
tion in the case of an oil company. The category might also include broader socio-economic
issues, dealing in general terms with subjects regarding technology or conservation
measures.
147 Id. § 1.162-20 (c)(2)(ii)(b)(1).
1 Id. § 1.162-20 (c)(4); see 26 U.S.C. § 162 (e)(2) (1976).
149 The line of demarcation between "general" and "grass roots" advertising becomes
tenuous when the issues addressed relate in whole or in part to topics that might have
sufficient legislative potential to cast doubt on their deductibility. The development or con-
servation of energy resources is only one such area.
10 See 435 U.S. at 783; N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1981, at A27, col. 2.
11" National Ass'n of Mfrs. v. Blumenthal, 466 F. Supp. 905 (D.D.C. 1979), appeal
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action was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the
court did note that there was no showing "that under no circum-
stances could the Government ultimately prevail" on the merits.15
The court's decision appears to be at least some support for the
argument that the Bellotti line of cases does not signal a change in
the tax treatment of lobbying expenses.
THE FIRST AMENDMENT "PROCESS" AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH
The effect of Bellotti on the regulation of corporate political
expression will no doubt be substantial, but the greatest impact of
the decision is likely to be in the area of corporate commercial
speech. In no other area are corporations confronted with first
amendment considerations more often than with regard to regula-
tions concerning advertising. Several government agencies, for ex-
ample, are empowered to prevent false or misleading advertising15"
and, consequently, courts are faced continually with advertisers'
claims that such efforts contravene the first amendment. 15 Until
recently, product advertising was denied first amendment protec-
tion altogether because of its commercial nature.15 The Supreme
Court retreated from this view in a series of cases, 15  and finally in
docketed, No. 79-1525 (D.C. Cir. May 22, 1979).
11 466 F. Supp. at 906. The district court cited favorably the Supreme Court's decision
in Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959). In Cammarano, the Court stated that
a "[n]ondiscriminatory denial of deduction from gross income to sums expended to promote
or defeat legislation" is not a denial of the freedom of speech. 358 U.S. at 513. Cf. Taxation
with Representation v. United States, 585 F.2d 1219, 1223-24 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 905 (1979) (nonprofit corporation's freedom of speech not impaired by lobbying
proscriptions exempting educational and charitable organizations from federal unemploy-
ment tax); Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1148 (Ct. Cl. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1107 (1975) (denial of charitable deduction for payments to association whose objec-
tives required legislative action did not impair taxpayer's freedom of speech).
1" Several government agencies scrutinize advertising for deceptive claims, including
the Federal Trade Commission, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1976), the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1976 & Supp. I 1977); and the Securities Exchange
Commission, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d, 77j (1976).
I" See, e.g., FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972); National Comm'n
on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978);
ITT Continental Baking Co. v. FTC, 532 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1976); Friends of the Earth v.
FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir.) 1971); In re Warner-Lambert Co., 86 F.T.C. 1398 (1975),
af'd, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978).
I" See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1942); L. TREE, supra note 4, at
§ 12-15 (1978).
I" The concept that commercial speech was not entitled to first amendment protection
was steadily eroded in a series of cases. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 825 (1975);
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 389 (1973).
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Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc. it recognized that even pure commercial speech is en-
titled to "some" first amendment protection.157 Despite the recog-
nition that commercial speech is entitled to "some" first amend-
ment protection, however, the Court in Virginia State Board also
noted that in certain circumstances, the "free flow" of information
to consumers could be restricted.15 8 Thus, the government may ban
speech that is more likely to deceive than inform,15 9 or that is re-
lated to illegal activity.160 Although the Court did not answer the
question of how far a state may go in regulating commercial
speech,"" its recent decision in Central Hudson elucidates the
four-part test which must be satisfied in order for such restrictions
to withstahd first amendment challenge. 6 2 The most important in-
quiry, however, remains obscured: When does a corporation's ad-
vertising transcend the category of "commercial speech," with its
intermediate level of protection, and become entitled to the full
first amendment protection that the Court found appropriate in
the Bellotti and Consolidated Edison decisions. 63
The question whether purely commercial expression merited first amendment protection
remained unanswered, however, until the Court's decision in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
167 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976). In Virginia State Board the Court concluded that purely
commercial speech warranted first amendment protection, id. at 770, reasoning that the free
flow of information was indispensable to the public in a free enterprise economy. Id. at 765.
Reiterating this position, the Court, in Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431
U.S. 85 (1977), held that a town ordinance which prohibited the posting of real estate "For
Sale" and "Sold" signs was unconstitutional because it restricted the free flow of truthful
commercial information. Id. at 98.
158 425 U.S. at 771-72. The Court noted that some forms of commercial speech regula-
tion are permissible, including time, place, and manner restrictions; regulations of deceptive
misleading commercial speech; and prohibitions of advertisements relating to illegal activi-
ties. Id.
119 Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13, 15-16 (1979); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar As'n,
436 U.S. 447, 464-65 (1978).
111 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388-
89 (1973).
61 The advertisements involved in Virginia State Board were not false or deceptive.
Id. at 771. The Court did not address, therefore, the issue of how pervasive a regulatory
scheme could be without overburdening the free flow of information. See also Linmark
Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 98 (1977),Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809
(1975); Reich, Preventing Deception in Commercial Speech, 54 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 775 (1979).
102 100 S. Ct. at 2351; see note 105 supra.
163 Compare Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. PSC, 100 S. Ct. at 2350 with Consoli-
dated Edison Co. v. PSC, 100 S. Ct. at 2332 and First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. at 786.
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Commercial Speech -Distinguishing "Product" and "Issue"
Advertising
While product advertising was not at issue in Bellotti, the
Court did observe in dicta that its recent commercial speech deci-
sions were illustrative of the fact
that the First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press
and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government
from limiting the stock of information from which members of
the public may draw. A commercial advertisement is constitution-
ally protected not so much because it pertains to the seller's busi-
ness as because it furthers the societal interest in the "free flow of
commercial information."' '
The first amendment protection of commercial speech is thus
predicated on the same principles which give rise to the safeguards
for political expression. Nevertheless, the Court has indicated that
the distinction between "commercial" and other forms of speech
must be preserved. 165 The boundaries between the two, however,
become indistinct when the corporation uses advertising to address
public issues, or purchases "institutional" advertising.166 Ironically,
the Bellotti case is a prime example of how such distinctions may
become blurred. Although the decision itself did not refer, not even
in dicta, to "institutional" or "issue" advertising, the right sought
by the petitioners-to disseminate their views on a graduated per-
sonal income tax-was actually the right to engage in issue adver-
tising.1 67 It is true that the decision did not go so far as to say that
corporations have full first amendment rights in the area of issue
advertising, but a careful reading of the majority and concurring
opinions would certainly support the position that Bellotti "pro-
cess" affords first amendment protection to issue advertising on
proposed referenda or other government action, without regard to
16 435 U.S. at 783. See also Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85,
97 (1977) (ordinance unconstitutional because it restricted the free flow of commercial infor-
mation); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975) ("the relationship of speech to the
marketplace of products or of services does not make it valueless in the marketplace of
ideas"); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-90 J1969); Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). See generally Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace:
Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 429, 435
(1971); The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARv. L. REv. 56, 145 n.23 (1976).
IU See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
1 See notes 127 & 145 supra.
167 See 435 U.S. at 768.
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whether such speech is directly related to the corporate business. 8
The reasons for allowing a lesser degree of constitutional pro-
tection to commercial speech also support the argument that re-
strictions on issue advertising should be closely examined lest they
be used to thwart the informational process. In Virginia State
Board, the Court noted that restraints on product advertising
would not significantly affect public access to information because
of the differences between product advertising and other forms of
speech.18 9 But the factors singled out by the Court to illustrate the
resiliency of commercial speech are less applicable when issue ad-
vertising is involved. While such advertising might ultimately inure
to the economic benefit of the corporation, it differs from tradi-
tional proauct advertising in at least two important respects: the
discussion of opinions on public issues does not lend itself to fac-
tual verification as do product claims; and, being less directly re-
lated to the profit motive, issue or institutional advertising is more
likely to be "chilled" by overbroad regulations. Moreover, such ad-
vertising, when viewed as part of the first amendment process
would seem to serve a broader societal interest than the "efficient
allocation of resources," the interest which commercial speech is
said to serve.170
To be sure, the Supreme Court has stated that where "direct
comments on public issues" were made by utility companies dis-
cussing "controversial issues of public policy," the full panoply of
first amendment protections would apply to the speech.171 Yet,
merely because an advertisement is editorial in tone and purports
to address a topic of public concern, it does not necessarily rise to
14 It should be noted, however, that corporate contributions to an electoral campaign
present substantially different considerations than "issue advertising" aimed at influencing
the general public. Thus, statutory restrictions on campaign contributions are likely to be
upheld. See note 126 and accompanying text supra.
19 Virginia State Bd. of Pharm. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 771 n.24 (1976). n considering the nature of the speech involved, the Court in Virginia
State Board noted that product claims could be evaluated factually and were less likely to
be inhibited by regulations because of the direct economic impact of advertising on the
company's business. Id. Therefore, commercial expression could be subject to regulation to
prevent deceptive claims without detriment to the informational process. Id.; accord,
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S.
350, 381 (1977).
17o Virginia State Bd. of Pharm. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
at 765.
"1 100 S. Ct. at 2349 n.5.
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the level of full first amendment protection." 2 Thus, corporations
seeking to challenge the constitutionality of regulations restricting
their advertising are confronted with a definitional problem at the
outset. As noted by Justice Stevens, concurring in the Central
Hudson decision:
Because "commercial speech" is afforded less constitutional pro-
tection than other forms of speech, it is important that the com-
mercial speech concept not be defined too broadly lest speech
deserving of greater constitutional protection be inadvertently
suppressed. 73
Unfortunately, the various opinions in the Consolidated
Edison and Central Hudson decisions present no clear picture of
where the line should be drawn. Furthermore, the Central Hudson
decision, in particular, raises once again the possibility that the
"economic interests" of the speaker, rather than the value of the
speech to the first amendment process, might come to be viewed as
the basis for ascertaining the degree of first amendment protection
172 Id. For an example of the distinction, compare Quinn v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 616
F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1980) and Rutledge v. Liability Ins. Indus., 487 F. Supp. 5 (W.D. La. 1979)
with National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 821 (1978). In Egg Nutrition, the issue before the court was whether an editorial
advertisement dealing with an issue of public concern should be classified as commercial
speech. 570 F.2d at 162-63. The advertisement in question made the misrepresentation
"that there is no scientific evidence that eating eggs increases the risk of ... heart [and
circulatory] disease. .. ." Id. at 159. In response to the argument advanced by the Com-
mission on Egg Nutrition that such expression was protected speech, the court noted that
the concept of commercial speech is not restricted to the "mere proposal of a particular
commercial transaction but extends to false claims as to the harmlessness of the advertiser's
product asserted for the purpose of persuading members of the reading public to buy the
product," id. at 163. The court concluded, therefore, that an advertiser must be prevented
from misleading the consumers under the veil of discussing matters of public interest. Id.
While the Egg Nutrition court did not elevate the commercial message in question to the
level of an issue advertisement, the court in Rutledge did just that. The plaintiff, an attor-
ney, sought to enjoin publication of insurance company advertisements that allegedly would
have influenced jurors to award lower amounts in damages. 487 F. Supp. at 7. The court
noted that regardless of the fact that the advertisements were of a commercial nature, "they
proposed no commercial transaction" and therefore should "not be characterized as com-
mercial speech." Id. at 8. The court concluded that because the advertisements were "state-
ments on matters of the public interest," any restrictions on their expressions would be
subjected to strict first amendment scrutiny. Id. In a similar factual situation, in Quinn v.
Aetna Life & Cas. Co., the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's finding that the
insurance company's advertisements criticizing the present system of adjudicating tort cases
were "not commercial speech removed from any 'exposition of ideas,'" 482 F. Supp. 22, 29
(E.D.N.Y. 1979), but rather were "fully protected political expression," id. at 29. Quinn v.
Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 616 F.2d at 40-41.
173 100 S. Ct. at 2358 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
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to which the speech is entitled.
The Consolidated Edison-Central Hudson Dilemma: Re-emer-
gence of the Business Interests Rationale?
As noted throughout this Article, the Bellotti decision based
its extension of first amendment rights to corporate political
speech upon the inherent value of the speech in the first amend-
ment's informational process. While Central Hudson and Consoli-
dated Edison reaffirmed the emphasis on the first amendment pro-
cess,1 7 4 they also indicate that a distinction must be made in the
level of protection where the regulation in question restricts "only
commercial speech. ' 175 Even when the advertisement may "relat[e]
to... questions frequently discussed and debated by our political
leaders," the Central Hudson opinion indicated that full first
amendment protection would not automatically apply, since
"many, if not most products may be tied to public concerns."'17
While few would quarrel with the need for the distinction, the
majority's bifurcated definition of "commercial speech" in Central
Hudson seems to obscure, rather than clarify the difference. One of
the definitions-"speech proposing a commercial transaction, 1 7 7
- appears to accord with the considerations previously noted that
justify lesser protection of commercial speech and therefore is not
objectionable from the standpoint of the first amendment
process. 178
Alternatively, however, the Court defines "commercial speech"
as "expression related solely to the economic interests of the
speaker and its audience. 170 This second definition, though appar-
ently used interchangeably with the first, is not synonomous. Un-
like the "commercial transaction" definition, the "economic inter-
ests" test would seem to have the potential to reach into all forms
of corporate advertising, 80 if we can reasonably assume that even
I' Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 100 S. Ct. at 2350; Consol-
idated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 100 S. Ct. at 2331.
175 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 100 S. Ct. at 2349.
76 Id. at 2349 n.5.
177 Id. at 2349.
178 Courts repeatedly have emphasized the capacity of product advertising to withstand
being "chilled" by regulation, due to the advertiser's profit motive. E.g., Bates v. State Bar,
433 U.S. at 381; see Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HAnv. L. Rv.
844, 853-58 (1970).
179 100 S. Ct. at 2349.
180 Indeed, corporate speech regarding the proposed Massachusetts constitutional
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issue advertising is undertaken because of the potential economic
benefit to the corporation. Moreover, the "economic interests" test
could be equally applicable to almost any form of expression.
Justice Stevens' opinion cautioned in this regard that:
Neither a labor leader's exhortation to strike, nor an econo-
mist's dissertation on the money supply, should receive any lesser
protection because the subject matter concerns only the economic
interests of the audience. Nor should the economic motivation of
the speaker qualify his constitutional protection; even Shakes-
peare may have been motivated by the prospect of pecuniary
reward.181
In the particular context of corporate speech, an emphasis on
"economic motivation" as grounds for lesser constitutional protec-
tion for valued forms of expression raises the questions of whether
and how media corporations can be excluded from the operation of
the rule, given the broad range of interests encompassed by mod-
ern communications conglomerates.182 Might not an editorial sup-
porting or opposing forest conservation efforts, for example, be
viewed as a form of "commercial speech" where a significant per-
centage of the corporation's business interests involve forest prod-
ucts manufacturing?8 " Notably, it cannot be ignored that
nonmedia corporations frequently perform press functions them-
selves by disseminating their views on public issues.18 4 A typical
amendment in Bellotti, see 435 U.S. at 770 & n.4, and the billing inserts discussing the
benefits of nuclear power in Con Edison, see 100 S. Ct. at 2330, arguably could have come
within the "economic interests" standard, thereby relegating the speech involved to the les-
ser first amendment status of "commercial" expression.
1-1 100 S. Ct. at 2358 (Stevens, J., concurring). The damage that would ensue should
the economic interests test be applied to disqualify speech from full first amendment pro-
tection was clearly pointed out by one commentator: "Little purpose would be served by a
first amendment which failed to protect newspapers, paid public speakers, political candi-
dates with partially economic motives and professional authors." Farber, Commercial
Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U. L. REv. 372, 382-83 (1979) (footnotes
omitted).
"I In 1977, the main lines of business for Time, Inc. were: Publishing, 57.5%; Forest
Products, 28.8%; Video, 6.3%; and Other, 7.4%. N.Y. Times, June 23, 1978 § D, at 12.
Temple-Eastex, the forest products company of Time, Inc. at the time, was described as
"the biggest private landowner in Texas." Id. The article also reported that Time, Inc.
planned to enter the containerboard industry by acquiring a company which allegedly con-
trolled "half a million more acres in Georgia and Alabama." Id.
183 See note 182 supra.
Corporate issue advertising performs a service traditionally identified with the
press-the broad dissemination of information and opinion to the general public. See Nim-
mer, Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does It Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26
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example is the oil corporation that seeks to explain to the public
the complexities of its earnings versus investment requirements
during an energy crisis because it believes press coverage to be in-
adequate due to a lack of time, space, or understanding of the is-
sues. If the process of disseminating information to the public is to
be protected, therefore, a distinction in first amendment protection
based on whether a corporation manages publishing or broadcast-
ing facilities is untenable.18 5 The dangers inherent in such distinc-
tions further highlight the fact that classifying corporate speech on
public issues as "commercial speech" because it relates to the cor-
poration's economic interests goes beyond what is necessary to dis-
tinguish commercial from other protected forms of speech and in-
vites damage to the process that Bellotti recognized as the primary
first amendment interest.
CONCLUSION
The Bellotti case, and the decisions of the United States Su-
HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1975), in which the author defines the press function in terms of "publi-
cation" in the broad copyright sense. Id. at 652.
18' The argument that restraints on corporate speech are necessary to prevent the dom-
ination of public opinion by wealthy corporate speakers does not justify different treatment
for media corporations. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPREssION 6-7
(1969); Comment, The New Commercial Speech Doctrine and Broadcast Advertising, 14
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385, 417-18 (1979). It seems reasonable to suggest, in view of the
current tendency toward concentration in the media, that the first amendment process
would be enhanced by the dissemination of the views of diverse corporate entities. Large
communications conglomerates, controlling multiple media outlets, are not uncommon. See
The Value Line Investment Survey, Edition 12, Sept. 19, 1980 (Ratings and Reports), at
1797-1801. "[T]oday, all but around 500 [newspapers] belong to one or another of 167 news-
paper groups. Independents are being bought out rapidly, at a clip of 50 to 60 papers a
year." Kleinfield, The Great Press Chain, N.Y. Times, April 8, 1979 (Magazine), at 41. To
compound the impact of this intensive concentration are the recent Supreme Court deci-
sions in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), and Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm'n, 412 U.S. 94 (1973). In these cases the Court
rejected first amendment and statutory claims to a "right of access" to the media by mem-
bers of the public, thereby debunking the theory that the press has any legal obligation to
act as a "fair and open market place for ideas." Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGs L.J.
631, 632-33 (1975). See generally Barron, An Emerging First Amendment Right of Access
to the Media? 37 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 487 (1969); Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee,
63 VA. L. REv. 731, 735-36 (1977). Corporations, as a group, are not monolithic, but re-
present a variety of interests and opinions. The corporation, moreover, is a valuable source
of specialized information. And finally, corporations, perhaps more so than individuals, have
the means to disseminate information and opinion effectively through "issue advertising"
when the press is either unwilling or unable to do so. Thus, if only for pragmatic reasons,
the first amendment process rationale is clearly preferable to a standard that measures the
degree of protection according to the "business interests" of the speaker.
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preme Court in Consolidated Edison and Central Hudson portend
significant changes in the law relating to constitutionally permis-
sible regulation of corporate speech. Although it is impossible to
anticipate what effect the decisions will have on the myriad stat-
utes restricting corporate expression now found in the codices of
the several states and the United States Code, it does appear that
such restrictions are now open to question. If nothing else, how-
ever, Bellotti and its progeny have created significant first and
fourteenth amendment safeguards for corporate management in-
terested in asserting their companies' positions on issues which
have arisen or may arise in the political process. While the limits
of this constitutional right to speak out on important issues of
public concern remain carefully circumscribed, it is hoped that the
right will continue to evolve in order that corporations may con-
tribute to more enlightened discussion in the political process.
